Merrill Lynch’s CDOs: The Thundering Herd Tramples Its Wealthiest Clients Yet Again

by Jacob Zamansky on June 21st, 2010 at 9:11 am : Comments 000

Individual investors who choose to do business with Merrill Lynch would be wise to take the time to read the complaint filed two years ago by Massachusetts regulators. They outlined, in impressive layman’s language, how the firm deceived its clients into believing that auction rate securities were safe, liquid, cash equivalent investments when in fact they were risky and illiquid.

“Time after time, when confronted with conflicts of interest, Merrill Lynch was consistent in that it placed its own interests ahead of its investor clients,” the complaint alleged.

An excellent compendium to that complaint was an article recently published by the Wall Street Journal about how Merrill brokers duped a bevy of the firm’s high net worth investors into buying high risk collateralized-debt obligations with assurances that they were also risk free.

“This was a great chance to participate with the big boys,” one client whose family lost millions because of Merrill’s CDOs recalls a broker as saying.

CDOs are indeed for the big boys and Merrill was the leading issuer of these toxic products.  But what Merrill clients clearly didn’t understand  — perhaps because they were never told — was that the CDOs they were buying were the lowest-rated slices; the higher rated slices were sold to more sophisticated institutional investors, the Journal says.

The Journal says that Merrill targeted investors with a net worth in excess of $5 million, and, therefore met the SEC standard of what constitutes a “sophisticated investor.”   That standard should have been altered long ago. For example, one of Merrill Lynch’s victims was a hair-salon entrepreneur - should someone who can leverage an expertise in shearing and coloring hair into a multi-million dollar business, automatically be qualified to evaluate highly sophisticated financial products?

Merrill’s defense is that the offering documents disclosed that the CDOs carried considerable risk, but that warning statement is contained in virtually every financial product the firm sells.  That’s why investors rely heavily on the representations made by their brokers.  And those representations will figure heavily into arbitration claims; if clients can prove that their brokers misled them, Merrill will likely need more of a defense than hiding behind it’s standard legal boilerplate.

Merrill ultimately was forced by the SEC to make whole the clients it fleeced with auction rate securities.  Buyers of CDOs likely have similarly strong claims and should aggressively pursue arbitration or court cases.  And investors who choose to continue doing business with Merrill should be wary of any product their brokers pitch that can’t be readily understood.  If a financial product sounds too good to be true, it probably is.

Filed under Wall Street
and CDOs, investors, Merrill Lynch